as 'the action of consciously willing or resolving; the exerconsciously willing or resolving; the exercise of the will', while the latter is 'the cise of the will', while the latter is 'the power of choice in regard to action'. In power of choice in regard to action'. In his his Enquiry Concerning Human UnderEnquiry Concerning Human Understanding standing, David Hume said that by liberty, , David Hume said that by liberty, 'we can only mean a power of acting or not 'we can only mean a power of acting or not acting, according to the determinations of acting, according to the determinations of the will' (Hume, 1777) . Recent developthe will' (Hume, 1777) . Recent developments in neuroscience and molecular ments in neuroscience and molecular genetics have a bearing on our undergenetics have a bearing on our understanding of volition, will and choice and standing of volition, will and choice and their relevance to clinical practice. This their relevance to clinical practice. This calls for further examination of the ancient calls for further examination of the ancient polemic between free will and determinism, polemic between free will and determinism, as as considered by St Augustine. Watson considered by St Augustine. Watson (1982 Watson ( ) (1982 has provided a valuable examinhas provided a valuable examination of this complicated field. Deteration of this complicated field. Determinism holds that behaviour is not free minism holds that behaviour is not free but is dictated by a chain of causation. It but is dictated by a chain of causation. It denies the reality of choice because of denies the reality of choice because of physical, neurobiological or theological physical, neurobiological or theological forces. Clinical psychiatry accepts that forces. Clinical psychiatry accepts that the will can be impaired in many mental the will can be impaired in many mental disorders, whereby the capacity to choose disorders, whereby the capacity to choose can be compromised. Individuals in such can be compromised. Individuals in such cases may then be considered not responsicases may then be considered not responsible for their behaviour. Some concession to ble for their behaviour. Some concession to determinism is thereby made, in that some determinism is thereby made, in that some of a person's behaviour is attributed to of a person's behaviour is attributed to the mental disorder. As brain function the mental disorder. As brain function comes to be increasingly understood, it is comes to be increasingly understood, it is possible that abnormal behaviour will possible that abnormal behaviour will be attributed less to the person's power be attributed less to the person's power of choice in regard to action, and more of choice in regard to action, and more to abnormalities of brain function or to abnormalities of brain function or genotype. .
exculpation' In the forensic context, Lord Mackay of In the forensic context, Lord Mackay of Clashfern has set out three questions to Clashfern has set out three questions to be asked when considering the case of a be asked when considering the case of a person who has committed a criminal act person who has committed a criminal act . Was the person aware of ' (his italics) (O'Shaughnessy, 1980: p. 302) . People with mental disorders may p. 302). People with mental disorders may be fully aware of their behaviour but will be fully aware of their behaviour but will nevertheless do something that is harmful nevertheless do something that is harmful to self or others. This leaves the third to self or others. This leaves the third question about the capacity to resist. In question about the capacity to resist. In the context of a consulting room or the context of a consulting room or ward, the psychiatrist or nurse may ward, the psychiatrist or nurse may consider whether the person has chosen to consider whether the person has chosen to do something and is therefore responsible do something and is therefore responsible for their behaviour. for their behaviour.
In cases of severe psychosis, many In cases of severe psychosis, many people would fail on all three of Mackay's people would fail on all three of Mackay's questions. Kraepelin referred to impairquestions. Kraepelin referred to impairments of self-awareness and self-regulation ments of self-awareness and self-regulation in schizophrenia as being part of the deficit in schizophrenia as being part of the deficit in executive control. A defect in volition in executive control. A defect in volition was central to his notion of dementia was central to his notion of dementia praecox, which he saw as being ultimately praecox, which he saw as being ultimately linked to a loss of will. It is now known that linked to a loss of will. It is now known that executive function is subserved at least in executive function is subserved at least in part by the prefrontal cortex and that there part by the prefrontal cortex and that there is prefrontal cortical dysfunction in schizois prefrontal cortical dysfunction in schizophrenia. Most clinicians would accept that phrenia. Most clinicians would accept that a person with schizophrenia or affective a person with schizophrenia or affective psychosis, who carries out an act that is psychosis, who carries out an act that is harmful to self or to others, may not be harmful to self or to others, may not be responsible. Having a psychosis will often responsible. Having a psychosis will often be a sufficient excuse. But what of condibe a sufficient excuse. But what of conditions such as the following: antisocial or tions such as the following: antisocial or borderline personality disorders; some acts borderline personality disorders; some acts of violence or abuse of others in of violence or abuse of others in psychosis; alcohol dependence; gambling; psychosis; alcohol dependence; gambling; sexual offences; parasuicidal acts; shopsexual offences; parasuicidal acts; shoplifting; the eating disorders; and the conlifting; the eating disorders; and the continued use of cannabis after recovery from tinued use of cannabis after recovery from a psychotic episode? a psychotic episode?
In each of these, the person usually In each of these, the person usually knows what he or she is doing, and is aware knows what he or she is doing, and is aware that the behaviour is undesirable, unhelpful that the behaviour is undesirable, unhelpful or harmful to self or others. In his comor harmful to self or others. In his commendable book on the legal response to mendable book on the legal response to actions by persons with mental disorders, actions by persons with mental disorders, Alec Buchanan writes, 'If psychiatric conAlec Buchanan writes, 'If psychiatric conditions are to be grounds for exculpation, ditions are to be grounds for exculpation, they must impair the sufferer's ability to they must impair the sufferer's ability to choose' (Buchanan, 2000: p. 80) . He is choose' (Buchanan, 2000: p. 80) . He is referring to forensic context, but the same referring to forensic context, but the same could be said in ordinary clinical practice. could be said in ordinary clinical practice. Buchanan describes how mental disorders Buchanan describes how mental disorders may impair the ability to choose by several may impair the ability to choose by several means: through a defect in consciousness, a means: through a defect in consciousness, a change in mood, in perception, in the change in mood, in perception, in the ability to think or the content of thought. ability to think or the content of thought. Buchanan rightly acknowledges that it can Buchanan rightly acknowledges that it can be difficult for clinicians to estimate how be difficult for clinicians to estimate how much the person has an impaired capacity much the person has an impaired capacity to choose and therefore to be responsible. to choose and therefore to be responsible. Indeed, quantification of capacity to resist Indeed, quantification of capacity to resist carrying out an act is not at present possible carrying out an act is not at present possible by any psychometrically established method. by any psychometrically established method. No instrument exists and constructing one No instrument exists and constructing one may not be feasible. In day-to-day psymay not be feasible. In day-to-day psychiatry, that capacity is assessed by the chiatry, that capacity is assessed by the subjective judgement of the clinician. As subjective judgement of the clinician. As an example, in an acute psychiatry unit, an example, in an acute psychiatry unit, nursing staff will say of someone with a nursing staff will say of someone with a psychosis whose actions are causing a psychosis whose actions are causing a problem, 'But some of that is behavioural'. problem, 'But some of that is behavioural'. This expression means that the presence of This expression means that the presence of a severe mental disorder is accepted, but in a severe mental disorder is accepted, but in the nurse's opinion there is a component the nurse's opinion there is a component that is volitional, that is not a product of that is volitional, that is not a product of the disorder itself, and that the person the disorder itself, and that the person could stop if they chose. It is this aspect could stop if they chose. It is this aspect of volition that deserves more formal of volition that deserves more formal consideration in clinical practice. consideration in clinical practice.
RECENT PROGRESS IN RECENT PROGRESS IN UNDERSTANDING VOLITION UNDERSTANDING VOLITION
Impairment of volitional control is now Impairment of volitional control is now known to be associated with specific neuroknown to be associated with specific neuropathology (Libet pathology . For instance, , 1999). For instance, Raine Raine et al et al (2001) reported an 11% reduc- (2001) reported an 11% reduction in the volume of prefrontal cortical tion in the volume of prefrontal cortical grey matter and reduced autonomic activity grey matter and reduced autonomic activity 2 7 3 2 7 3 ( 2 0 0 5 ) , 1 8 6 , 2 7 3^2 7 4 ( 2 0 0 5 ) , 1 8 6 , 2 7 3^2 7 4
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The neglect of volition The neglect of volition
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in 21 people with antisocial personality in 21 people with antisocial personality disorder, compared with controls. This disorder, compared with controls. This means that such people may differ from means that such people may differ from others in the part of the brain dealing with others in the part of the brain dealing with executive functions including volition executive functions including volition and will, although psychiatrists are unlikely and will, although psychiatrists are unlikely to agree whether this removes personal to agree whether this removes personal responsibility. responsibility. Molecular genetics is producing eviMolecular genetics is producing evidence about heritable vulnerability to some dence about heritable vulnerability to some personality traits and psychiatric syndromes personality traits and psychiatric syndromes . There are now a number of . There are now a number of studies, all unconfirmed, reporting associastudies, all unconfirmed, reporting associations between neurotransmitter polymorphtions between neurotransmitter polymorphisms and personality traits such as novelty isms and personality traits such as novelty seeking, violence, gambling and alcohol seeking, violence, gambling and alcohol dependency. , however, argues dependency. , however, argues that 'even if human beings are genetically that 'even if human beings are genetically deterministic systems, their behavior may deterministic systems, their behavior may still be unpredictable and they may still still be unpredictable and they may still possess free will'. He adds, 'behavior possess free will'. He adds, 'behavior influenced by genes is no more deterinfluenced by genes is no more deterministic than is behavior influenced by the ministic than is behavior influenced by the environment'. These scientific advances environment'. These scientific advances are prompting the wider community to be are prompting the wider community to be concerned about the extent to which free concerned about the extent to which free will really exists, in contrast to behaviour will really exists, in contrast to behaviour that is biologically determined. that is biologically determined.
REINSTATING VOLITION REINSTATING VOLITION IN TREATMENT IN TREATMENT
It is timely for psychiatry to consider the It is timely for psychiatry to consider the merits or inadvisability of reinstating some merits or inadvisability of reinstating some degree of personal accountability among degree of personal accountability among its patients. Some behaviours need not its patients. Some behaviours need not invariably be attributed to the disorder, invariably be attributed to the disorder, but to the individual's choice. Such a but to the individual's choice. Such a proposal is not intended to be harsh or proposal is not intended to be harsh or reactionary. Patients can be seen as responreactionary. Patients can be seen as responsible in whole or part for what they have sible in whole or part for what they have done. To remove all responsibility for the done. To remove all responsibility for the behaviour may often be unhelpful; it can behaviour may often be unhelpful; it can also be demeaning, because it implies that also be demeaning, because it implies that the person is in some way incomplete, being the person is in some way incomplete, being deficient in self-control, as in the deficient in self-control, as in the minderminderwertigkeiten wertigkeiten, a sinister term used in the , a sinister term used in the era of Nazi psychiatry. In a recent exchange era of Nazi psychiatry. In a recent exchange in in The Lancet
The Lancet, Tan (2003) (2003) argued against the autonomy axiom as the argued against the autonomy axiom as the guiding tenet of Western bioethics, a tenet guiding tenet of Western bioethics, a tenet founded on the belief that doctors can help founded on the belief that doctors can help patients only insofar as they help thempatients only insofar as they help themselves or as they allow others to help. Sato selves or as they allow others to help. Sato argues that, 'psychiatrists should help the argues that, 'psychiatrists should help the patient so that he will eventually be able patient so that he will eventually be able to help himself to help himself ' (Sato, 2003) . What is expli- ' (Sato, 2003) . What is explicit in this recent exchange of views is that cit in this recent exchange of views is that anorexia nervosa is one disorder in which anorexia nervosa is one disorder in which volition -the capacity for choice and selfvolition -the capacity for choice and selfregulation of behaviour -becomes a cenregulation of behaviour -becomes a central issue in treatment. In a similar way, tral issue in treatment. In a similar way, the psychological treatments of alcohol the psychological treatments of alcohol misuse, gambling or borderline personality misuse, gambling or borderline personality disorder all include an attempt to augment disorder all include an attempt to augment self-regulation. Through this, individuals self-regulation. Through this, individuals are helped to regain their own volitional are helped to regain their own volitional control. control.
CONCLUSIONS CONCLUSIONS
Reinstating the place of volition in clinical Reinstating the place of volition in clinical practice would do much to temper the practice would do much to temper the assumption that behaviour harmful to self assumption that behaviour harmful to self or others is usually excusable if a mental or others is usually excusable if a mental disorder is present. It would also point the disorder is present. It would also point the way to cognitive psychotherapy focused way to cognitive psychotherapy focused on augmenting the person's power of on augmenting the person's power of choice in action. With the advances now choice in action. With the advances now being made in the neurosciences and behavbeing made in the neurosciences and behavioural genetics, it is all the more important ioural genetics, it is all the more important that clinical psychiatry be well informed that clinical psychiatry be well informed about biological determinants of volitional about biological determinants of volitional control. For free will to be eclipsed by control. For free will to be eclipsed by biological determinism would impoverish biological determinism would impoverish an essential aspect of human existence. an essential aspect of human existence. Psychiatry has a contribution to make here: Psychiatry has a contribution to make here: in both assessment and treatment, it could in both assessment and treatment, it could place more appropriate weight on volition place more appropriate weight on volition and personal responsibility. and personal responsibility. 
